Conditional Cash Transfers, Public Provision of Private Goods, and Income Redistribution
研究现金转移与实物转移结合时的筛选机制，发现这种组合能实现最优再分配，且通过降低穷人获得的不可分割品质量可超越最优福利水平。
This paper examines the role of cash transfers as a screening device when combined with in-kind transfers. It shows that linking in-kind to cash transfers makes first-best redistribution possible despite the government's inability to tell rich and poor individuals apart. Moreover, the maximal attainable welfare for the poor can be pushed beyond its first-best level by distorting downward the quality of the indivisible good the poor receive relative to the cash value of their net transfers. Using in-kind transfers alone, as in Besley and Coate (1991), leads to a third-best solution.