A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking
结合代理理论和前景理论，构建了一个高管风险承担的行为代理模型，解释不同监控形式下高管的风险选择行为，并提出了结合监控、绩效与问题框架的命题。
Building on agency and prospect theory views, we construct, in this article, a behavioral agency model of executive risk taking. In the model we combine elements of internal corporate governance with problem framing to explain executive risk-taking behavior. The model suggests that executive risk taking varies across and within different forms of monitoring and that agents may exhibit risk-seeking as well as risk-averse behaviors. We develop specific propositions that combine monitoring with performance and the framing of strategic problems to explain executive choices of strategic risk. The resulting propositions enhance and extend the agency-based corporate governance literature on executive risk taking.