The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts
研究了在逆向选择和道德风险并存的情况下，制造商与零售商之间使用数量强制合同而非零售价格维持的战略价值，揭示了限制筛选可能增加零售商租金并影响下游竞争，为合同不完全性提供了新解释。
We explore the strategic value of quantity forcing contracts in a manufacturer-retailer environment under both adverse selection and moral hazard. Manufacturers dealing with (exclusive) competing retailers may prefer to leave contracts silent on retail prices, whenever other aspects of the retailers' activity remain nonverifiable. Two effects are at play when moving from retail price maintenance to quantity forcing. First, restricting screening possibilities may increase retailers' rent. Second, such a restriction affects downstream competition. This latter effect may justify using quantity forcing contracts and, more generally, shed light on a novel source of contractual incompleteness.