Wages, Effort, and Incentive Compatibility in Life-Cycle Employment Contracts
梳理了生命周期雇佣合同中各种违约行为，扩展了Lazear模型，发现工资不能持续超过边际产品，且可行合同集常为空，对理解长期雇佣激励有参考价值。
Existing models of incentive compatibility in life-cycle employment contracts arrive at different predictions partly because of the different kinds of "contract-breaking" behavior allowed in them. This paper sets out and classifies the full range of such behaviors, argues that no model has yet incorporated all of them, and examines the consequences of doing so in the context of Lazear's well-known model. In the extended model, wages cannot rise faster than marginal products throughout the entire contract, and the set of feasible contracts can often be empty, even when both parties can commit to terminate the contract whenever it is broken by the other party.