Traders vs. Relationship Managers: Reputational Conflicts in Full-Service Investment Banks
构建模型解释投资银行家为何难以管理利益冲突：银行可通过完成复杂交易建立技术能力声誉，但可能损害客户利益；而行为声誉则是能力得到证明后的奢侈品。模型揭示了交易与咨询部门间的冲突及技术变革对两类声誉相对重要性的影响。
We present a model that explains why investment bankers struggle to manage conflicts of interest. Banks can build a type reputation for technical competence by performing complex deals that may not serve their clients' interest; on the other hand, banks can sustain a behavioral reputation by refraining from doing so. A behavioral reputation is a luxury reserved for banks that have proven their abilities. The model sheds light on conflicts between the trading and advisory divisions of investment banks, as well as the consequences of technological change for time variation in the relative strength of behavioral- and type-reputation concerns.