Focal points in tacit bargaining problems: Experimental evidence
通过新实验设计检验谢林关于隐性讨价还价中焦点作用的理论，发现与收益无关的线索能成为有效焦点，提高效率并导致系统性的不平等分配。
We use a new experimental design to test Schelling's hypotheses about the nature and effectiveness of focal points in tacit bargaining problems. In our design, as in many real-world bargaining problems, each player's strategies are framed as proposals about what part of a stock of valuable objects she is to take, and there are payoff-irrelevant cues which define relations between players and objects. In line with Schelling's hypotheses, we find that such cues serve as powerful focal points. Their presence increases efficiency even in games where there is no efficient and equal division, and induces systematically unequal payoff distributions.