Economics of Antipoaching Enforcement and the Ivory Trade Ban
构建了一个包含非法偷猎、执法努力和合法捕杀的大象保护模型，分析不同政策下（禁止或允许象牙贸易）的执法效果和大象种群数量，并以赞比亚为例进行实证分析。
Abstract A model of elephant conservation that includes illegal poaching, enforcement effort, and legal culling is used to analyze enforcement and elephant populations for alternative policies, with and without legal trade in ivory. Consistent with previous theoretical models, banning trade may increase or decrease equilibrium stocks. As an empirical application, information for Zambia, along with sensitivity analysis, are used to show that the ivory trade ban is more effective in conserving the African elephant ( Loxodonta africana ) than in permitting open trade. However, in all situations, current elephant populations likely exceed optimal levels as perceived by the range states, and further reductions in elephant numbers might be expected.