The Effects of Health Insurance and Self-Insurance on Retirement Behavior
利用健康与退休研究数据，估计了一个考虑储蓄和不确定医疗支出的退休动态规划模型，发现医疗保险和不确定性对理解退休行为至关重要，并模拟了提高医保资格年龄和削减社保福利对工作年限的影响。
This paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of employer-provided health insurance, Medicare, and Social Security on retirement behavior. Using data from the Health and Retirement Study, we estimate a dynamic programming model of retirement that accounts for both saving and uncertain medical expenses. Our results suggest that Medicare is important for understanding retirement behavior, and that uncertainty and saving are both important for understanding the labor supply responses to Medicare. Half the value placed by a typical worker on his employer-provided health insurance is the value of reduced medical expense risk. Raising the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 67 leads individuals to work an additional 0.074 years over ages 60–69. In comparison, eliminating 2 years worth of Social Security benefits increases years of work by 0.076 years.