In Search of Workers' Real Effort Reciprocity-a Field and a Laboratory Experiment
通过实地实验发现，按小时计酬的工人对自身或同事的工资变化不调整努力程度，这与实验室结果相悖；进一步实验室实验表明，只有当工人能明确计算雇主的剩余收益时，工资才会正向影响努力。
We present a field experiment to assess the effect of own and peer wage variations on actual work effort of employees with hourly wages. Work effort neither reacts to an increase of the own wage, nor to a positive or negative peer comparison. This result seems at odds with numerous laboratory experiments that show a clear own wage sensitivity on effort. In an additional real-effort laboratory experiment we show that explicit cost and surplus information that enables to exactly calculate employer’s surplus from the work contract is a crucial pre-requisite for a positive wage-effort relation. This demonstrates that employee’s reciprocity requires a clear assessment of the surplus at stake.