Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation
研究企业所有者与经理之间存在信息不对称时，在可重新谈判的情况下，激励合同应依赖的最优或有事项集，并解释了为何双方会主动限制可合同化事项，从而内生地说明合同简洁性。
In a dynamic model of asymmetric information between the owner of a firm and a manager, we investigate the optimal set of contingencies on which an incentive contract should depend when renegotiation is possible. In particular, we characterize the circumstances in which the contracting parties find it desirable to deliberately restrict what the owner can monitor, thereby limiting the contractible contingencies. Our findings thus provide an endogenous explanation for contract simplicity, in contrast to those based on transactions costs or bounded rationality.