PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL TYING IN A WINNER‐TAKE‐ALL MARKET*
研究了赢者通吃的双寡头系统中，垂直整合的垄断供应商如何通过技术捆绑排挤对手，其福利效果取决于均衡选择。
In a winner‐take‐all duopoly for systems in which firms invest to improve their products, a vertically integrated monopoly supplier of an essential system component may have an incentive to advantage itself by technological tying. If the vertically integrated firm is prevented from technologically tying, there is an equilibrium in which the more efficient firm invests and serves the entire market. However, another equilibrium may exist in which the less efficient firm wins the market. Technological tying enables a vertically integrated firm to foreclose its rival. The welfare implications of technological tying are ambiguous and depend on equilibrium selection.