Organization and Inequality in a Knowledge Economy
提出一个均衡理论，解释在知识作为关键生产要素、劳动者技能异质的经济中，工作组织如何通过知识层级匹配影响工资不平等，发现组织化相比自给自足扩大了知识和工资的横截面差异。
We present an equilibrium theory of the organization of work in an economy where knowledge is an essential input in production and agents are heterogeneous in skill. Agents organize production by matching with others in knowledge hierarchies designed to use and communicate their knowledge efficiently. Relative to autarky, organization leads to larger cross-sectional differences in knowledge and wages: low skill workers learn and earn relatively less. We show that improvements in the technology to acquire knowledge lead to opposite implications on wage inequality and organization than reductions in communication costs.