Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited*
研究了两人完全信息可转移效用战略博弈中，所有主要可变威胁讨价还价与仲裁解的一致性，并提出了一个更完整的理论，包括博弈的分解、解的闭式公式、公理化证明及推广到私有信号博弈。
Abstract For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This confluence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Raiffa, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of two-person games with transferable unility, the article presents a more complete theory that expands their solution. Specifically, it presents: (1) a decomposition of a game into cooperative and competitive components, (2) an intuitive and computable closed-form formula for the solution, (3) an axiomatic justification of the solution, and (4) a generalization of the solution to games with private signals, along with an arbitration scheme that implements it. The objective is to restart research on cooperative solutions to strategic games and their applications.