Reputational cheap talk
分析了一个掌握私人信息的专家在关心自身声誉时如何报告信息。专家基于报告和事后状态被评估声誉，因此不愿如实报告，均衡下只能传递部分信息。研究结果对理解声誉如何影响信息传递有参考价值。
We analyze information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert's reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truth telling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others .