Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions
通过实验检验了在多次出价的拍卖中，前一轮的标价是否会影响后续出价，发现对于熟悉物品，高标价会推高后续出价，这对实验设计有重要启示。
In most experimental auctions, researchers ask participants to bid on the same item in multiple potentially binding rounds, posting the price submitted by the top bidder or bidders after each of those rounds. If bids submitted in later rounds are affiliated with posted prices from earlier rounds, this practice could result in biased value estimates. In this article, we discuss the results of an experiment designed explicitly to test whether posted prices affect bidding behavior. We find that for familiar items, high posted prices lead to increased bids in subsequent rounds. Our results have implications for researchers conducting experimental auctions.