The welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets: the case of bargaining
研究了垄断厂商对具有讨价还价能力的下游企业实行三级价格歧视的福利效应，发现当连锁店的整合威胁不可信时，价格歧视会降低对称下游企业的投入品价格。
This article examines the welfare effects of third‐degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power. One of the downstream firms (the “chain store”) can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals. Bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits, bargaining weights, and concession costs. If the chain's integration threat is not credible, price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms.