Consumer Search and Double Marginalization
研究发现，在消费者搜寻市场中，双重加价问题比传统认知更严重，因为垄断制造商会利用消费者的信息不足进一步提高批发价，但竞争性批发市场中的制造商可能不愿向消费者披露价格。
The well-known double marginalization problem understates the inefficiencies arising from vertical relations in consumer search markets where consumers are uninformed about the wholesale prices charged by manufacturers to retailers. Consumer search provides a monopoly manufacturer with an additional incentive to increase its price, worsening the double marginalization problem and lowering the manufacturer's profits. Nevertheless, manufacturers in more competitive wholesale markets may not have an incentive to reveal their prices to consumers. We show that retail prices decrease in search cost, and so both industry profits and consumer surplus increase in search cost.