War, Moral Hazard, and Ministerial Responsibility: England After the Glorious Revolution
重新审视诺斯和温加斯特关于光荣革命后英格兰可信承诺与主权债务的论点，指出革命解决的核心不是约束国王违约，而是通过大臣责任机制解决产生国王渎职的道德风险。
I reexamine Douglass North and Barry Weingast's argument regarding credible commitment and sovereign debt in post-revolution England. The central problem that the architects of the revolution settlement had to solve, I argue, was not the king's frequent reneging on financial commitments (a symptom), but the moral hazard that generated the kings' malfeasance (the underlying cause). The central element of the revolution settlement was thus not better holding kings to their commitments, but better holding royal advisors to account for all consequences of the Crown's policies—through what we now call ministerial responsibility.