Agricultural Markets as Relative Performance Evaluation
揭示新鲜果蔬和特种谷物合同通过依赖市场价格的支付机制间接提供相对绩效激励，使种植者报酬随自身产出增加而增加，随他人产出增加而减少。
Abstract Relative performance schemes such as tournaments are commonly used in markets for a variety of livestock and processing commodities, while explicit versions of these schemes are rarely used in markets for fresh fruits and vegetables and specialty grains. We show how contracts for these latter commodities do in fact provide relative performance incentives, albeit indirectly, via a payment mechanism that depends on market prices. In such contracts, compensation is often an increasing function of revenue; this implements a relative performance scheme by making each grower's payment an increasing function of his own output but a decreasing function of other's output.