Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice
比较了统一最优非线性税收与两个竞争性税收当局选择的均衡税收，发现竞争性税收下累进性和再分配水平更低，富人和穷人的偏好截然不同，中产阶级的偏好取决于初始条件。
In an economy where agents have different productivities and mobility, we compare a unified nonlinear optimal taxation with the equilibrium taxation that would be chosen by two competing tax authorities if the same economy were divided into two states. The overall level of progressivity and redistribution is unambiguously lower under competitive taxation; the “rich” are always in favor of competing authorities, whereas the “poor” are always in favor of unified taxation; the preferences of the middle class depend on the initial conditions in terms of the distribution of abilities, the relative power of the various classes, and mobility costs.