Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom
分析两阶段彩票上的偏好关系，发现决策者不总是遵循复合彩票约简公理，但满足复合独立性公理；作者提出几种复合占优公理作为约简公理的替代，它们严格弱于复合彩票约简公理。
Preference relations over two-stage lotteries are analyzed. Empirical evidence indicates that decisionmakers do not always behave in accordance with the reduction of compound lotteries axiom, but they seem to satisfy a compound independence axiom. Although the reduction and the compound independence axioms, together with continuity, imply expected utility theory, each of them by itself is compatible with all possible preference relations over simple lotteries. Using these axioms, the author analyzes three different versions of expected utility for two-stage lotteries. The author suggests several different compound dominance axioms as possible replacements of the reduction axiom, which are strictly weaker than the reduction of compound lotteries axiom. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.