Tournaments and Office Politics: Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment
通过真实努力实验，研究发现锦标赛制度在无办公室政治时能提高努力，但存在办公室政治时，竞争者的相互破坏行为会削弱激励效果，导致产出下降。
Tournaments can elicit more effort but sabotage may attenuate the effect of competition. Because it is hard to separate effort and ability, the evidence on tournaments is thin. There is even less evidence on sabotage because these acts often consist of subjective peer evaluation or “office politics.” We discuss real effort experiments in which quality adjusted output and office politics are compared under piece rates and tournaments and find that tournaments increase effort only in the absence of office politics. Competitors subvert each other more in tournaments, and as a result, workers produce less because they expect to be sabotaged. (D82, M54)