Matching Severance Payments with Worker Losses in the Egyptian Public Sector
研究埃及公共部门自愿离职补偿方案如何匹配工人失业损失，提出利用劳动力调查数据估算损失的方法，避免过度补偿。
Severance pay programs can reduce political opposition and minimize the social costs of labor redundancies. In Egypt, only voluntary programs are feasible because legal limitations preclude layoffs and strong organized labor groups oppose any weakening of job security protections. A common problem with voluntary severance programs, however, is that they tend to overpay workers relative to the welfare losses they expe-rience from displacement. This article estimates the losses that public sector workers would incur if they were displaced from their jobs and simulates several voluntary severance schemes to deter-mine how well the schemes match compensation payments to these estimated losses. It provides a fairly strong argument for looking at the structure of opportunity costs and wage profiles when designing severance programs. It shows that significant overpay-ment can be avoided by matching compensation payments to the expected losses of workers. It also provides a method for estimating these losses from standard labor force surveys that are available in most countries. Public sector restructuring and privatization have caused substantial labor re-