Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital Markets
通过分析银行次级债券与国债的利差对银行风险的敏感度，评估次级债券增强市场纪律的效果，发现其作用较小，且评级机构引导的行为可能不符合监管标准。
This study evaluates the potential for bank subordinated notes and debentures to enhance market discipline by analyzing the sensitivity of the interest-rate spread between bank-related debt and comparable Treasury securities to measu res of bank risk. The analysis indicates that the market discipline benefits of subordinated notes and debentures appear to be relatively small. Furthermore, even if the bond rating agencies could induce bankers to behave in a particular way, the findings suggest this induced behavior may not be viewed by regulators as consistent with their standards of safety and soundness. Copyright 1988 by Ohio State University Press.