Resolving the Agency Problems of External Capital through Options
研究股票期权如何解决Jensen和Meckling提出的外部资本代理问题，即管理者过度消费非金钱福利或进行风险转移。通过所有者管理者和外部融资方分别持有看涨和看跌期权的策略，可以解决这些激励问题，为管理期权和可转换债券的存在提供经济解释。
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the role of stock options in resolving the agency problems of external capital as originally identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976). These problems are precipitated by managerial incentives a) to consume excessive non‐pecuniary benefits or perquisites beyond the optimal level for sole ownership and b) to engage in risk shifting in productive decisions so as to transfer wealth from external capital contributors. These incentive problems can be resolved through a strategy that judiciously combines call and put options retained by the owner‐manager and external financiers, respectively. The resolution of the agency problems through this mechanism provides an economic rationale for the existence of managerial stock options and convertible debt.