Social influence effects and managerial compensation evidence from Germany
研究德国企业中CEO与董事会主席的社会相似性如何影响薪酬制定，并发现董事会监督力度取决于薪酬水平和主要股东的监督激励。
Abstract I extend existing theories of social influence effects on executive compensation while at the same time showing the context dependence of these effects. Using original data on German firms and a longitudinal design, results of this study suggest that the operating of social influence mechanisms depends on demographic and social similarity between CEOs and board chairs. The findings reconcile previous mixed findings on the role of CEO human capital factors such as education and tenure and furthermore show that board vigilance is conditional on board compensation and the presence of major shareholders with an incentive to monitor board behavior. Finally, the study contributes to compensation and corporate governance research by providing evidence on how social influence effects operate outside the United States. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.