Implications of Ownership, Regulation, and Market Structure for Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Electric Utility Industry Before and After the New Deal
利用新政前后美国电力行业的制度差异作为自然实验，通过供需联立方程模型分析1930和1942年数据，发现监管、公有产权和竞争降低了电价并提高了配置效率。
This study evaluates the impact of variations in regulation, ownership, and market structure in the U.S. electric utility industry during the period surrounding the New Deal, when considerable institutional variation provided a natural experiment for analysis. A simultaneous-equations model of electricity supply and demand is developed and estimated for the years 1930 and 1942 with firm- and market-level data collected on utilities serving cities of population 50, 000 or more. The paper offers evidence that regulation, public ownership, and competition served to reduce electricity prices and enhance allocative efficiency during the period under examination. © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology