Sequential location games
研究了消费者非均匀分布时企业序贯进入市场的选址博弈，发现对于单调、驼峰形和U形密度分布，均衡选址与进入顺序无关，并揭示了均匀分布的特殊性。
We study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially, and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval. We show that for certain classes of densities, including monotone and—under some additional restrictions—hump‐shaped and U‐shaped ones, equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and advertisement in media markets, winner‐take‐all competition, trade‐offs between profits in the short and the long run, and firms operating multiple outlets.