Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
分析多物品的最优拍卖设计。第一个模型中竞拍者对每件物品的估价服从二元分布，此时最优拍卖是有效的，要么独立拍卖要么捆绑销售；第二个模型放宽二元分布假设，最优拍卖则无效。
This paper analyses optimal auctions of several objects. In the first model bidders have a binary distribution over their valuations for each object, in which case the optimal auction is efficient. The optimal auction takes one of two formats: either objects are sold in independent auctions, or a degree of bundling is introduced in the sense that the probability a bidder wins one object is increasing in her value for the other. The format of the optimal auction may depend upon the number of bidders. In the second model the restriction to binary distributions is relaxed, and the optimal auction is then inefficient.