Gaming Performance Fees By Portfolio Managers
研究发现，基于业绩的薪酬合同很难区分有能力的投资经理，并揭示了现有改革方案（如延迟奖金）无法杜绝操纵行为，除非提高持仓和策略的透明度。
We show that it is very difficult to devise performance-based compensation contracts that reward portfolio managers who generate excess returns while screening out managers who cannot generate such returns. Theoretical bounds are derived on the amount of fee manipulation that is possible under various performance contracts. We show that recent proposals to reform compensation practices, such as postponing bonuses and instituting clawback provisions, will not eliminate opportunities to game the system unless accompanied by transparency in managers' positions and strategies. Indeed, there exists no compensation mechanism that separates skilled from unskilled managers solely on the basis of their returns histories. (c) 2010 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology..