Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia
通过印度尼西亚600多个村庄道路项目的随机实地实验，发现政府审计从4%提高到100%使缺失支出减少8个百分点，而基层监督仅在特定条件下有效。
This paper presents a randomized field experiment on reducing corruption in over 600 Indonesian village road projects. I find that increasing government audits from 4 percent of projects to 100 percent reduced missing expenditures, as measured by discrepancies between official project costs and an independent engineers’ estimate of costs, by eight percentage points. By contrast, increasing grassroots participation in monitoring had little average impact, reducing missing expenditures only in situations with limited free-rider problems and limited elite capture. Overall, the results suggest that traditional top-down monitoring can play an important role in reducing corruption, even in a highly corrupt environment.