A clash of governance logics: Foreign ownership and board monitoring
研究了在利益相关者导向的环境中，股东导向的外国所有者是否以及何时会引入股东导向的治理实践来改变公司治理逻辑，发现外资所有权高时才会激活董事会监督，且这种影响在无大股东、高风险和业绩差的公司中更强。
We ask whether and when shareholder‐oriented foreign owners are likely to change corporate governance logics in a stakeholder‐oriented setting by introducing shareholder‐oriented governance practices. We focus on board monitoring and claim that because the bundle of practices used in a stakeholder context does not protect shareholder‐oriented foreign owners' interests, they seek to introduce their own practices. Our results suggest that board monitoring is only activated when shareholder‐oriented foreign ownership is high and that the influence of foreign ownership is especially strong in firms without large domestic owners, with high levels of risk and poor performance. Our findings uncover the possibility of the co‐existence of different corporate governance logics within a given country, shaped by the nature and weight of foreign owners Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.