Contracting in Vague Environments
研究了在信息模糊（客观不确定性）环境下最优契约面临的新权衡：激励提供与利用内生异质性之间的取舍，即使代理人风险中性且无需保险，最优契约也可能扭曲努力以放松激励相容约束。
This paper shows that a new trade-off arises in the optimal contract when contracting takes place with vague information (objective ambiguity), reflecting that real-world contracting often takes place under imprecise information. The choice-theoretic framework captures a decision-maker's attitude towards vagueness by his optimism. The new trade-off is between incentive provision and exploitation of heterogeneity that arises endogenously because of the vague environment. Consequently, the optimal contract may distort effort in order to relax incentive compatibility and fully exploit the endogenously created heterogeneity, even when the agent is risk neutral and there is no insurance need in the relationship.