On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
探讨非合作博弈中哪些纳什均衡是策略稳定的，提出满足逆向归纳、迭代占优和不变性三个条件的集值均衡概念，并证明每个博弈至少存在一个这样的均衡集。
A basic problem in the theory of noncooperative games is the following: which Nash equilibria are strategically stable, i.e. self-enforcing, and does every game have a strategically stable equilibrium?We list three conditions which seem necessary for strategic stabilitybackwards induction, iterated dominance, and invariance-and define a set-valued equilibrium concept that satisfies all three of them.We prove that every game has at least one such equilibrium set.Also, we show that the departure from the usual notion of single-valued equilibrium is relatively minor, because the sets reduce to points in all generic games.