Management Quality and Equity Issue Characteristics: A Comparison of SEOs and IPOs
利用手工收集的数据，研究了增发和首次公开发行公司的管理层质量与股权发行特征的关系，发现高质量管理层能降低信息不对称，从而吸引更有声誉的承销商、降低发行成本，且对增发的影响小于首次公开发行。
We use hand‐collected data on the management quality of firms making seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) or initial public offerings (IPOs) to analyze the relationship between management quality and equity issue characteristics, and to compare the effect of management quality on SEOs versus IPOs. We hypothesize that higher quality managers are more credible to equity market investors, thereby reducing the information asymmetry they face in the market and outsiders’ information production costs. Therefore, the equity issues of higher management quality firms will have more reputable underwriters, smaller underwriting spreads, and other expenses, and smaller SEO discounts. Further, since better managers will be able to select better projects, higher management quality firms will have larger offer sizes. Finally, since SEO firms are likely to suffer from less information asymmetry compared to IPO firms, these effects will be smaller for SEOs than for IPOs. Our findings support the above hypotheses. Our direct tests of the relationship between management quality and information asymmetry, and our comparison of information asymmetry in SEOs versus IPOs provide further support for these hypotheses.