Are Vertical Restraints Pro‐ or Anticompetitive? Lessons fromInterstate Circuit
通过分析《州际电路》案，指出不能从当事人行为推断合谋，且相关纵向限制具有效率提升作用，并据此提出解释该案并解决文献争议的纵向限制理论。
At the heart of antitrust law is the prohibition on horizontal collusion. To enforce this prohibition, the law must accurately define what collusion entails. One of the most controversial areas in antitrust is the issue of vertical restraints. In the last 20 years, economists have come up with any number of pro‐ and anticompetitive rationales for such restraints. Given this, perhaps one of the most important antitrust cases is Interstate Circuit v. United States, a case that combines issues of horizontal collusion and vertical restraints. A review of the facts shows that collusion cannot be properly inferred from the behavior of the parties involved and that the relevant vertical restraints had efficiency‐enhancing properties. We then use Interstate Circuit’s behavior to generate a theory of vertical restraints that not only explains the events in the case but also addresses an important controversy in the vertical restraints literature.