An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem*
研究一群人在二元集体决策中，通过轻微随机化的多数规则，使得所有选民如实投票成为唯一的纳什均衡，并证明孔多塞渐近效率成立。
Abstract We consider a group of individuals who face a binary collective decision. Each group member holds some private information, and all agree about what decision should be taken in each state of nature. However, the state is unknown, and members can differ in their valuations of the two types of mistakes that might occur, and in their prior beliefs about the true state. For a slightly randomized majority rule, we show that informative voting by all voters is the unique Nash equilibrium, that this equilibrium is strict, and that the Condorcet asymptotic efficiency result holds in this setting.