The Takeover Deterrent Effect of Open Market Share Repurchases
研究公开市场股票回购是否能够威慑收购，发现回购活动与收购概率显著正相关，并解释了以往研究中的矛盾结论。
ABSTRACT This paper examines whether open market share repurchases deter takeovers. We model pre‐repurchase takeover probability as a latent variable and examine its impact on the firm's decision to repurchase shares. Given specification tests reject the Tobit model, we turn to the censored quantile regression method of Powell (1986, Journal of Econometrics 32, 143–155). We find a significantly positive relation between open market share repurchases and takeover probability, and we reconcile empirical findings in previous studies that contradict predictions. Repurchase activity is inversely related to firm size, consistent with smaller firms having greater information asymmetry, and is related to temporary, but not permanent, cash flows.