Managerial Turnover in a Changing World
研究了企业如何制定利润最大化的管理层更替政策，发现随着管理者任职时间增长，企业留任所需的生产率门槛会下降；与有效水平相比，利润最大化政策要么导致所有任期阶段过度留任，要么在早期过度解雇、后期过度留任。
We characterize a firm's profit-maximizing turnover policy in an environment where managerial productivity changes stochastically over time and is the managers' private information. Our key positive result shows that the productivity level that the firm requires for retention declines with the managers' tenure in the firm. Our key normative result shows that, compared to what is efficient, the profit-maximizing policy either induces excessive retention (i.e., inefficiently low turnover) at all tenure levels, or excessive firing at the early stages of the relationship followed by excessive retention after sufficiently long tenure.