Voting by Committees
证明，在可分离偏好下，委员会投票机制是唯一同时满足选民主权和不可操纵性的投票方案，类似于克拉克-格罗夫斯机制的特征刻画。
The main result of this paper characterizes voting by committees. There are n voters and K objects. Voters must choose a subset of K. Voting by committees is defined by one monotone family of winning coalitions for each object; an object is chosen if it is supported by one of its winning coalitions. This is proven to be the class of all voting schemes satisfying voter sovereignty and nonmanipulability on the domain of separable preferences. The result is analogous to the characterization of Clarke-Groves schemes in that it exhibits the class of all nonmanipulable schemes on an important domain. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.