THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF UPSTREAM MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF DOWNSTREAM ENTRY BARRIERS*
研究下游存在进入壁垒且企业双边谈判时，上游企业横向合并的动机及其对行业绩效的影响，发现短期消费者不受损，长期因促进下游进入而受益，但社会最优可能需要限制上游合并。
We examine the incentives for upstream firms to consolidate horizontally and the impact of this process on industry performance, when there are downstream entry barriers and firms negotiate bilaterally. In the short run, consumers are not worse off with upstream mergers, since consolidation only results in a redistribution of industry rents. In the long run, consumers are better off after upstream mergers, since they induce more entry into that segment. When social welfare is evaluated, a limit on upstream consolidation may prevent excessive entry; but upstream entry can be sometimes insufficient, if the retailers' intrinsic bargaining power is excessive.