A Political Economic Analysis of U.S. Rice Export Programs to Japan and South Korea: A Game‐Theoretic Approach
用博弈论框架分析美国对日韩大米出口项目，发现两国在4%关税减让下达到纳什均衡，对研究贸易干预和市场准入有参考价值。
The Uruguay Round Agreement on agriculture has contributed to the increase in U.S. and world rice trade since 1994. Despite this, the Japanese and Korean rice markets continue to be characterized by high levels of trade intervention. This article attempts to analyze both import markets incorporating econometric estimates and public choice theory in a game‐theoretic framework. Various scenarios are analyzed. The results show that the overall Nash equilibrium occurs with a 4% tariff reduction for Japan and Korea under the U.S. Market Development Program, which includes the Market Access Program and Foreign Market Development Program.