Committee Design with Endogenous Information
研究同质代理人通过投票汇总信息时，如何设计投票规则以激励信息获取并高效汇总信息，发现只有代理人信息足够准确时，要求高票（如全体一致）才能改变现状的规则才可能最优。
Identical agents gather costly information, and then aggregate it through voting.Because information is a public good, information is underprovided relative to the social optimum. A "good" voting rule must give incentives to acquire information,as well as aggregate information efficiently. A voting rule that requires a large plurality (in the extreme, unanimity) to upset the status quo can be optimal only if the information available to each agent is sufficiently accurate. This result is independent of the preferences of voters and of the cost of information. Copyright The Review of Economic Studies Limited, 2004.