Wage Determination Theory and the Five-Dollar Day at Ford
用现代工资决定理论分析福特1914年五美元日薪制，认为效率工资解释不成立，而租金分享理论（因劳工集体行动威胁）更合理，这一事件标志着劳资关系转折点。
This paper examines the five-dollar day compensation policy instituted by the Ford Motor Company in 1914 in light of recent developments in wage-determination theory. The new wage was above the opportunity cost of the labor employed. Yet various efficiency wage theories, by which high wages increase output, are shown to provide an implausible explanation. The particular (and epochal) technical change that occurred at Ford and the attitudes and beliefs of relevant actors suggest instead a rent-sharing theory driven by the threat of collective action by labor. This confluence, not the money, marks the episode as a watershed.