The effects of parental altruism on the governance of family-managed firms
结合经济学、公司治理和家族企业文献，论证父母利他主义与私有产权、所有者管理结合时，如何影响所有者管理者的自我控制，进而导致道德风险、敲竹杠和逆向选择等代理冲突，并探讨部分家族企业如何规避这些负面影响。
We draw on the economic, corporate governance, and family business literatures to explain why the effects of family on family firms makes this governance form theoretically distinct from those of public and private non-family firms. Our thesis is that parental altruism, when combined with private ownership and owner-management, influences the ability of the firm's owner-manager to exercise self-control, which, in turn, can expose some family firms to conflicts rooted in the agency threats of moral hazard, hold-up, and adverse selection. We then discuss why some other family firms are able to minimize these dark side threats and thereby attain altruism's brighter side. Finally, we discuss how altruism's influence changes over time as ownership becomes dispersed among family members and across generations. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.