Does Competition Eliminate Discrimination? Evidence from the Commercial Sex Market in Singapore
研究新加坡芽笼街头性交易市场，发现尽管竞争激烈，性工作者仍基于种族对客户实行价格歧视，与客户感知支付意愿和自身态度一致。
The street sex worker market in Geylang, Singapore is a highly competitive market in which clients can search legally at negligible cost, making it ideal for testing Diamond's hypothesis regarding search and monopoly pricing. As Diamond predicts, price discrimination survives in this market. Despite an excess supply of workers, but consistent with their self‐reported attitudes and beliefs, sex workers charge whites (Bangladeshis) more (less), based on perceived willingness to pay, and are more (less) likely to approach and reach an agreement with them. Consistent with taste discrimination, they avoid Indians, charge more and reach an agreement with them less frequently.