Conflicts and Regrets in the Venture Capitalist-Entrepreneur Relationship
研究风险投资家与CEO之间的冲突如何引发后悔情绪，发现节奏冲突会加剧特权冲突，进而导致CEO既后悔选择错误伙伴又后悔未能主动应对。
The goal of this paper is to examine whether conflicts with venture capitalists () could prompt chief executive officers (s) to experience regret of action (regarding their poor partner choice) or regret of inaction (regarding their own inability to avert conflict). We argue that it is important to examine such feelings of regret that could motivate to change their financial intermediation and collaboration strategies in the future. We propose that and may experience two types of conflict: (1) pacing conflicts regarding the direction and speed of venture advancement driven by perceived inequities in economic and social exchange; and (2) prerogative conflicts about the allocation of control rights and relationship issues driven by the perceived inequities in power relations. We hypothesize that pacing conflicts will be related to increasingly intense prerogative conflicts, whereas the latter will be associated with both types of regret. The proposed model is tested with structural equation modeling techniques applied to the data collected from104 of ‐backed ventures. All the hypotheses are supported. Our main finding is that appear to be ambivalent about their conflict with , regretting both their prior choices as an error of judgment (regret of action) and their own lack of initiative (regret of inaction).