Human Capital, Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure
研究了杠杆公司的最优劳动合同，发现员工因合同锁定而承担高破产成本，公司最优资本结构平衡这些人力成本与债务税盾，无需道德风险等摩擦即可解释实际债务水平。
ABSTRACT We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade‐off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage.