Cooperation against Theft: A Test of Incentives for Water Management in Tunisia
研究通过理论模型和突尼斯2001-2003年数据，检验合作管理如何通过同伴监督减少水表篡改盗窃，发现高水价、弱惩罚和大型合作社增加盗窃风险，而良好设计的激励措施能有效降低盗窃。
Abstract Water theft carried out by manipulating water meters constrains volumetric pricing in semi‐arid regions. Cooperative management can reduce theft and improve incentives for efficient water use by inducing peer monitoring. Using a theoretical model, we show that theft is more likely when prices are high, punishments are weak, and cooperatives are large. We also show how cooperative membership and punishment levels are determined endogenously by constraints on monitoring. We test the model on data from Tunisia for the years 2001–2003, relying on instruments that proxy for unobservable monitoring costs. The results confirm that well‐designed incentives can reduce theft, and that constraints on monitoring costs affect institutional design.