Financial Contracting
梳理了经济学家对企业财务结构决策看法的演变，从视盈利为给定，到承认管理层行为影响盈利，再到认识到企业价值取决于决策权或控制权的分配，并论证了决策权方法对理解风险投资合同和债权多样性具有实证价值。
This paper discusses how economists' views of firms' financial structure decisions have evolved from treating firms' profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims.